The Truth About Argentina’s $500,000 Citizenship by Investment Plan

By Dr. Germán Creimerman, attorney specializing in immigration law and international business

Introduction

In May 2025, the Executive Branch announced the upcoming publication of an Emergency Decree (DNU) that would substantially modify the immigration regime and access to Argentine citizenship. Among the most striking points is the creation of a "citizenship by investment" mechanism, granting nationality to those who invest more than USD 500,000 in productive projects. This article provides an in-depth analysis of the constitutional, legal, and political feasibility of this proposal, its relationship with the current system of citizenship by significant contribution, relevant jurisprudence, and the institutional context surrounding the initiative.

1. Constitutional Framework: Limits of Article 99 Section 3 of the National Constitution

The National Constitution establishes in Article 99, Section 3 that the Executive Power:

"Shall not in any case, under penalty of absolute and incurable nullity, issue provisions of a legislative nature. Only when exceptional circumstances make it impossible to follow the ordinary procedures provided for in this Constitution for the enactment of laws... may it issue decrees on grounds of necessity and urgency..."

It is important to emphasize that the Emergency Decree (DNU) is a legal instrument that has historically been used by governments to circumvent the powers of Congress for purely political purposes—and this case is no exception. These decrees were originally intended as exceptional measures, meaning they should only be issued in situations of urgency that justify bypassing the legislative process, and only when Congress is unable to convene. These two conditions are rarely met—and certainly not in the case of this particular decree. Furthermore, the law establishes that such decrees must be endorsed by the Chief of Cabinet and approved by the Standing Bicameral Committee of Congress.

The regulation of citizenship falls under political rights, with direct implications for the representative system. Therefore, its modification via DNU may be considered unconstitutional. In the case "CELS v. PEN – DNU 70/17" (Case No. 3061), Chamber V of the Federal Administrative Court declared unconstitutional a DNU that substantially altered the immigration regime. The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that DNUs are for exceptional use and that sensitive matters must be legislated by Congress.

2. The Judiciary as the Sole Authority for Granting Citizenship by Exception

Citizenship by "significant contribution" is established in Article 16 of Law 346. This pathway requires:

• A substantiated petition before the Judiciary,

• An assessment of the applicant’s economic, cultural, scientific, or social contribution,

• And a final judicial ruling.

  
  

In other words, the decision to grant citizenship through this mechanism lies exclusively with the Judiciary. No decree can eliminate this route without a profound legislative reform, which must be debated and enacted by Congress. In fact, any attempt to prevent federal judges from granting citizenship through this channel would violate the guarantee of judicial independence and the principle of legal reserve in matters of fundamental rights.

3. Constitutional Jurisprudence and Doctrine: Key Cases

• Ruling 333:1891 (Argentine Supreme Court): The Court declared unconstitutional a three-day appeal period for misdemeanors, citing violation of due process.

• "CELS v. PEN – DNU 70/17”: The Administrative Court emphasized that a DNU cannot restrict fundamental rights or replace Congress in sensitive matters such as immigration.

• Advisory Opinion OC-6/86, Inter-American Court of Human Rights: The regulation of human rights, such as access to citizenship, must be surrounded by substantive and formal guarantees.

  
  

4. Institutional and Political Context: A Government Without a Parliamentary Majority

A recent legislative initiative from the Executive was rejected by the Senate in May 2025, despite previously receiving preliminary approval in the Chamber of Deputies. This outcome once again demonstrated that, without a parliamentary majority, it is unfeasible to advance structural reforms without broad-based agreements. This sets a direct precedent reinforcing the notion that deep reforms in citizenship or political rights must go through the regular legislative process, with broad debate and institutional legitimacy—not through unilateral instruments such as DNUs.

Any attempt to modify the Citizenship Law or eliminate judicial control over citizenship granting will require a prolonged political discussion. Precedents show such a change could take years, and during that time, the judicial pathway via significant contribution will remain fully valid.

5. Position on Other Proposed Reforms

From a legal and technical perspective:

• Tightening the conditions for obtaining residency and permanence for individuals with criminal records or irregular status is reasonable, necessary, and constitutional. Such measures are already present in benchmark legislations like those of the European Union, Canada, and the United States, where serious crimes—even without final conviction—can be grounds for inadmissibility or revocation of residency (e.g., Section 212 of the U.S. Immigration and Nationality Act and Directive 2008/115/EC of the EU). In Argentina, Article 29, Section h) of Law 25.871 authorizes the exclusion or expulsion of persons convicted of intentional crimes, although practical implementation has been limited due to operational and political shortcomings.

Official data from the National System of Statistics on Penal Execution (SNEEP 2023) reveals that approximately 22.4% of inmates in the Federal Penitentiary Service are foreigners, many without final convictions or regular immigration status. This underscores the urgency of a more preventive and effective policy. Therefore, we support the principle that a criminal conviction confirmed in the second instance should be sufficient to review immigration status, provided due process, legal defense, and judicial review are guaranteed.

These reforms do not violate the republican principle but rather reinforce it: they strengthen the justice system, prevent abuses, and allow authorities to exercise sovereign control over entry and stay in national territory. Responsible immigration control is not incompatible with human rights—it is one of their basic conditions. The State has not only the right but the duty to protect its community.

• Permanent residence by investment is already contemplated in Law 25.871 (Articles 23 to 27), particularly concerning temporary and permanent residency categories for those demonstrating lawful means of livelihood and significant economic contributions to the country. Article 23, Section h) allows the granting of permanent residency to foreigners who prove productive, scientific, or technological investments, though the regulation sets no minimum threshold, leaving it to secondary regulation. The issue is not the absence of a legal framework but rather administrative inefficiency and lack of proper regulation. In recent years, there has been a notable lack of objective criteria, evaluation mechanisms, and coordination between Immigration and the Ministry of Economy to implement this regime.

It is important to highlight that this route is legally more solid and legitimate than replacing the system through a DNU, which could be challenged as unconstitutional. To activate it, no legislative reform is needed—only a precise executive regulation, clear administrative resolutions, and the political will to attract qualified foreign investment within the existing legal framework. Furthermore, its effective implementation would meet a legitimate demand from the global business community interested in settling in Argentina, without the need to alter the constitutional foundations of immigration law or disturb the republican order.

Conclusions

1. The attempt to create a citizenship-by-investment regime via DNU is highly questionable from a constitutional and legal perspective.

2. Citizenship by significant contribution, granted by the Judiciary, remains a valid, effective, and constitutional route.

3. The Executive cannot limit or revoke this judicial authority by decree.

4. Any real reform will have to go through Congress, where the current administration lacks a majority or guaranteed approval.

5. Some of the Executive's proposals are reasonable and already included in existing legislation, so they do not justify invoking urgency and necessity.

   
   

Ultimately, Argentina operates under a system of checks and balances. No citizenship policy, however innovative or convenient it may seem, can be imposed without respecting the principles of the rule of law and established institutional channels. Argentina is not a minor jurisdiction lacking institutions, like those that have developed automatic citizenship-by-investment programs without judicial review. On the contrary, it is a constitutional republic with a complex legal system, where nationality entails a set of rights and obligations deeply tied to the democratic pact. Therefore, any reform in this area must preserve legal oversight and the due process principles that characterize our legal order. Argentina is a constitutional republic where access to nationality is governed by laws, jurisprudence, and guarantees that must be preserved. Granting Argentine citizenship requires rigorous case-by-case analysis and cannot become a transactional benefit subject to temporary economic criteria.